| asc:AgentService | Agent Service | A governed agent with a formal service contract. Grounded on PROV-O (software agent provenance) and DCAT (service description). Governance (mandate, autonomy level, policies) is expressed via ODRL and attached to each agent instance. | dcat:DataService, prov:SoftwareAgent |
| asc:AntiPattern | Anti-Pattern | A known inefficiency pattern with a documented alternative. Append-only registry. | --- |
| asc:AntiPattern | Anti-patron | A known inefficiency pattern with a documented alternative. Append-only registry. | --- |
| asc:FunctionalBloc | Bloc fonctionnel | SI urbanization bloc (depth 3 of 3) — atomic element. Maps 1:1 to a capability. Urbanization invariant: one canonical pattern per bloc; redundant blocs are violations. | --- |
| asc:BootstrapIdentity | Bootstrap Identity | Agent persona and operating instructions injected at session start: name, emoji, soul prompt, tool notes. | --- |
| asc:BreakingChangeType | Breaking Change Type | A classification of schema modifications by their impact on existing consumers. Breaking changes require human gate; non-breaking changes may proceed at L2. | --- |
| asc:Capability | Capability | A capability exercised by an agent, linked to the Capability Map. Equivalent to cap:Capability (the canonical bra0 capability registry, BFO disposition-grounded). The owl:equivalentClass axiom is the P1 bridge of the asc:↔cap: staged-convergence per ADR-098; P2 (full merge refactor — delete asc:Capability and re-range all asc: properties to cap:Capability) is queued post-S6 close, gated on the pending cap:Capability → cap:RegisteredCapability rename. Until P2 lands, the bridge allows asc:capability range satisfaction over cap: instances under DL reasoning. | --- |
| asc:Capability | Capacité | A capability exercised by an agent, linked to the Capability Map. Equivalent to cap:Capability (the canonical bra0 capability registry, BFO disposition-grounded). The owl:equivalentClass axiom is the P1 bridge of the asc:↔cap: staged-convergence per ADR-098; P2 (full merge refactor — delete asc:Capability and re-range all asc: properties to cap:Capability) is queued post-S6 close, gated on the pending cap:Capability → cap:RegisteredCapability rename. Until P2 lands, the bridge allows asc:capability range satisfaction over cap: instances under DL reasoning. | --- |
| asc:ComputeTier | Compute Tier | Resource allocation tier (T0=Manual to T5=Ollama MacBook). | --- |
| asc:Skill | Compétence | A prompt-based agent. Session-scoped, injected into context at session start. Gated by env/bins/config/OS requirements. | asc:AgentService |
| asc:RedundancyFinding | Constat de redondance | A finding from an urbanization review identifying functional overlap between two or more capabilities, agents, or implementations. Redundancy findings must be resolved: merge, deprecate, or justify the exception. | prov:Entity |
| asc:InputDefence | Défense en entrée | Multi-layer defence configuration for an agent that reads external content. Carries the deterministic sanitiser reference (L1-L3) and the canary token configuration (L5). SHACL completeness shape requires both. Typed as prov:Plan: an InputDefence is a specification for how an agent is to handle untrusted input (a plan, not the activity that executes it). Via PROV-O subsumption: prov:Plan ⊏ prov:Entity ⊏ bfo:0000031 (generically dependent continuant) — BFO 2020 grounding. | prov:Plan |
| asc:EfficiencyObservation | Efficiency Observation | A measured gain from an anti-pattern correction or process improvement. Proof of value. | prov:Entity |
| asc:ExecApproval | Exec Approval Rule | Per-agent execution approval rule: security mode (deny/allowlist/full), ask mode, glob patterns, safe bins. | --- |
| asc:GatingRequirements | Exigences de filtrage | Load-time conditions for agent activation: required binaries, env vars, config keys, supported OS. | --- |
| asc:Plugin | Extension | A code-based agent extension with a TypeScript handler. Process-scoped, full SDK access, can register tools/hooks/channels. | asc:AgentService |
| asc:ExternalEngagementMode | External Engagement Mode | Closed enumeration of three modes governing how an agent may interact with external (non-allowlist) OSS or communication surfaces. The hierarchy is monotone: NoExternal ⊏ ReadExternal ⊏ DraftExternal. Posting is never granted by mode — it is always prohibited per asc:PostExternal mandate clause. | --- |
| asc:FunctionalBloc | Functional Bloc | SI urbanization bloc (depth 3 of 3) — atomic element. Maps 1:1 to a capability. Urbanization invariant: one canonical pattern per bloc; redundant blocs are violations. | --- |
| asc:FunctionalQuartier | Functional Quartier | SI urbanization quartier (depth 2 of 3). Groups related capabilities within a zone under single-parent containment. | --- |
| asc:FunctionalZone | Functional Zone | Top-level SI urbanization zone (depth 1 of 3). Canonical zones: Control Plane, Semantic Layer, Data Plane, Bus Neural. Zones group quartiers that share cross-cutting concerns. | --- |
| asc:GatingRequirements | Gating Requirements | Load-time conditions for agent activation: required binaries, env vars, config keys, supported OS. | --- |
| asc:GraphInterface | Graph Interface | A service interface between an agent and a named graph. Typed as a dcat:DataService. Carries the property scope and SPARQL pattern that define read/write access. | dcat:DataService |
| asc:BootstrapIdentity | Identité d'amorçage | Agent persona and operating instructions injected at session start: name, emoji, soul prompt, tool notes. | --- |
| asc:InputDefence | Input Defence | Multi-layer defence configuration for an agent that reads external content. Carries the deterministic sanitiser reference (L1-L3) and the canary token configuration (L5). SHACL completeness shape requires both. Typed as prov:Plan: an InputDefence is a specification for how an agent is to handle untrusted input (a plan, not the activity that executes it). Via PROV-O subsumption: prov:Plan ⊏ prov:Entity ⊏ bfo:0000031 (generically dependent continuant) — BFO 2020 grounding. | prov:Plan |
| asc:GraphInterface | Interface de graphe | A service interface between an agent and a named graph. Typed as a dcat:DataService. Carries the property scope and SPARQL pattern that define read/write access. | dcat:DataService |
| asc:Mandate | Mandat | The formal delegation from the human controller (mandant) to an agent (mandataire). Typed as an odrl:Policy: it carries the permissions, prohibitions, and duties that bound the agent's reads, writes, and actions, plus temporal validity. Machine-validatable, SHACL-enforced. Only the mandant may create or modify a Mandate. | odrl:Policy |
| asc:Mandate | Mandate | The formal delegation from the human controller (mandant) to an agent (mandataire). Typed as an odrl:Policy: it carries the permissions, prohibitions, and duties that bound the agent's reads, writes, and actions, plus temporal validity. Machine-validatable, SHACL-enforced. Only the mandant may create or modify a Mandate. | odrl:Policy |
| asc:ExternalEngagementMode | Mode d'engagement externe | Closed enumeration of three modes governing how an agent may interact with external (non-allowlist) OSS or communication surfaces. The hierarchy is monotone: NoExternal ⊏ ReadExternal ⊏ DraftExternal. Posting is never granted by mode — it is always prohibited per asc:PostExternal mandate clause. | --- |
| asc:EfficiencyObservation | Observation d'efficience | A measured gain from an anti-pattern correction or process improvement. Proof of value. | prov:Entity |
| asc:OntologyScope | Ontology Scope | The set of OWL/SHACL classes an agent is authorized to define, instantiate, or modify. Used with sh:targetClass to enumerate writable types. | --- |
| asc:Plugin | Plugin | A code-based agent extension with a TypeScript handler. Process-scoped, full SDK access, can register tools/hooks/channels. | asc:AgentService |
| asc:PluginHook | Plugin Hook | A lifecycle interception point registered by a plugin (e.g. before_tool_call, after_tool_call, before_agent_start). Hooks are the mechanism for runtime governance. | --- |
| asc:PluginHook | Point d'interception | A lifecycle interception point registered by a plugin (e.g. before_tool_call, after_tool_call, before_agent_start). Hooks are the mechanism for runtime governance. | --- |
| asc:ToolPolicy | Politique d'outillage | ODRL-based access control for agent tools. Maps to platform tool policy cascades (profiles, allow/deny lists, sandbox, sub-agent restrictions). | odrl:Policy |
| asc:SubagentPolicy | Politique de sous-agents | Governance constraints on sub-agent spawning: max depth, max children, concurrency, model, timeout. | --- |
| asc:OntologyScope | Périmètre ontologique | The set of OWL/SHACL classes an agent is authorized to define, instantiate, or modify. Used with sh:targetClass to enumerate writable types. | --- |
| asc:FunctionalQuartier | Quartier fonctionnel | SI urbanization quartier (depth 2 of 3). Groups related capabilities within a zone under single-parent containment. | --- |
| asc:Realization | Realization | An attestation that a capability has been operationally demonstrated by a concrete substrate (tool, component, pipeline). A Realization carries: the linked capability (via bra0:targetsCapability minted in the bra0: application profile v1.3.0), the substrate reference, empirical findings (F1..Fn), an exec-log, the Sacha sign-off marker, and an asc:provenLevel xsd:integer ∈ [0,3] encoding the Step-3-Stop attestation level. Three distinct PROVEN Realizations (provenLevel = 3) against the same capability promote that capability to bra0:doctrineStatus PROVEN per ADR-116 §2.3. Formally declared v0.10.0 — 2026-05-23 per ADR-116 §2.8 Q-CMAT-2a (en-bloc YES). Repairs the doctrine debt where this class was only referenced via rdfs:subClassOf in realizations/component-realizations.ttl without an upstream owl:Class declaration. Companion property : asc:provenLevel. | --- |
| asc:RedundancyFinding | Redundancy Finding | A finding from an urbanization review identifying functional overlap between two or more capabilities, agents, or implementations. Redundancy findings must be resolved: merge, deprecate, or justify the exception. | prov:Entity |
| asc:UrbanizationReview | Revue d'urbanisation | A formal review by the urbanization authority (architect) that validates: (1) no functional redundancy with existing blocs, (2) correct zone/quartier placement, (3) canonical implementation pattern compliance, (4) cross-cutting concern alignment. Every new capability MUST pass an urbanization review before creation. | prov:Activity |
| asc:ExecApproval | Règle d'approbation d'exécution | Per-agent execution approval rule: security mode (deny/allowlist/full), ask mode, glob patterns, safe bins. | --- |
| asc:Realization | Réalisation | An attestation that a capability has been operationally demonstrated by a concrete substrate (tool, component, pipeline). A Realization carries: the linked capability (via bra0:targetsCapability minted in the bra0: application profile v1.3.0), the substrate reference, empirical findings (F1..Fn), an exec-log, the Sacha sign-off marker, and an asc:provenLevel xsd:integer ∈ [0,3] encoding the Step-3-Stop attestation level. Three distinct PROVEN Realizations (provenLevel = 3) against the same capability promote that capability to bra0:doctrineStatus PROVEN per ADR-116 §2.3. Formally declared v0.10.0 — 2026-05-23 per ADR-116 §2.8 Q-CMAT-2a (en-bloc YES). Repairs the doctrine debt where this class was only referenced via rdfs:subClassOf in realizations/component-realizations.ttl without an upstream owl:Class declaration. Companion property : asc:provenLevel. | --- |
| asc:ServiceLevelAgreement | Service Level Agreement | Performance, cost, and quality bounds for an agent. | --- |
| asc:AgentService | Service d'agent | A governed agent with a formal service contract. Grounded on PROV-O (software agent provenance) and DCAT (service description). Governance (mandate, autonomy level, policies) is expressed via ODRL and attached to each agent instance. | dcat:DataService, prov:SoftwareAgent |
| asc:Skill | Skill | A prompt-based agent. Session-scoped, injected into context at session start. Gated by env/bins/config/OS requirements. | asc:AgentService |
| asc:SubagentPolicy | Sub-Agent Policy | Governance constraints on sub-agent spawning: max depth, max children, concurrency, model, timeout. | --- |
| asc:ToolPolicy | Tool Policy | ODRL-based access control for agent tools. Maps to platform tool policy cascades (profiles, allow/deny lists, sandbox, sub-agent restrictions). | odrl:Policy |
| asc:UrbanizationReview | Urbanization Review | A formal review by the urbanization authority (architect) that validates: (1) no functional redundancy with existing blocs, (2) correct zone/quartier placement, (3) canonical implementation pattern compliance, (4) cross-cutting concern alignment. Every new capability MUST pass an urbanization review before creation. | prov:Activity |
| asc:FunctionalZone | Zone fonctionnelle | Top-level SI urbanization zone (depth 1 of 3). Canonical zones: Control Plane, Semantic Layer, Data Plane, Bus Neural. Zones group quartiers that share cross-cutting concerns. | --- |